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Introduction
Apart from the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom is
the only large, highly industrialised country to have
been self-sufficient in oil in recent years. In 1984, the
gross value of sales of UK crude oil and natural gas,
probably at its peak, was equal to 7.1 per cent, and
government revenue based directly on oil and gas
production to 3.9 per cent, of the country's GDP at
factor cost; clearly important, but on the face of it not
overwhelmingly so.
Drilling in the UK sector of the North Sea began in
1964. Gas began to be produced in commercial
quantities in 1967, and oil in 1975. The nationalised
gas industry has over time converted the whole of its
supply from manufactured to natural gas, and the
country has latterly imported about a quarter of its gas
supply. In 1981, the UK became for the first time a net
exporter of oil, and in 1984 net exports represented
about 43 per cent of production, then 126 mn metric
tonnes. It is now said to be the world's seventh-largest
oil producer.
Official estimates [UK Department of Energy
1986:7-12] put the oil reserves remaining at the end of
1985 as between 1,050 and 4,120 mn tonnes, eight to 33
further years' supply at the 1984 rate of production.
Remaining gas reserves at the same date were given as
between 868 and 2,830 bn cubic metres, which would
be 22 to 74 years' supply. Such estimates tend to go on
expanding, but it is at least a possibility that UK
offshore oil will be virtually finished by the end of the
century, especially because the low prices of 1986 may
render unprofitable some of the fields that would have
been attractive at the high prices of 1980. It would not
be surprising if sales and tax revenue never again reach
their 1984 levels in real terms.
UK oil came in on the crest of the high-price wave.
What is amazing is that, far from bringing rapid
growth and prosperity, the oil years have been times of
comparative stagnation and of unemployment rates
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unprecedented since the 1930s. The years of actual
decline in GDP were 1974 and 1975, when commercial
production of North Sea oil began, and 1980 and 1981,
when the UK became a net exporter, in both cases hard
on the heels of an enormous rise in the commodity
price. The 1986 drop in the real price back toward the
level of early 1973 has been widely thought of as a
boost to recovery. The story seems almost like a
mirror image of that of Nigeria or Mexico. We may
reasonably ask what quirk of circumstance or feat of
mismanagement can have turned a bonanza into a
misfortune.
Here I shall look first at the policies on release of the
deposits and realisation of their value for the nation
and then turn to the question of how stabilisation went
wrong in the face of the changes which the North Sea
riches brought.
Exploitation and Taxation
With some qualifications, it can be said that the UK
opened its gas and oil extraction to the private market.
The qualifications are that a state-owned body, the
British National Oil Corporation (BNOC), was set up
by the Labour Government in 1975 as an integrated oil
company competing with the private sector and
possessing certain privileges, and survived until it was
largely privatised and then abolished by the
Conservative government over 198 1-85. In addition
the state-owned British Gas Corporation had certain
privileges in purchase, and statutory monopoly
powers over domestic sales, of North Sea gas, though
these too were restricted by an Act of 1981. At
most times allocation of leases to private firms has
been discretionary rather than (as in the US Outer
Continental Shelf) by auction. [Hamilton 1978, 17ff.,
discusses the reasons for discretionary allocation and
other features of early leasing policy; see also Garnaut
and Clunies Ross, 1983; 279-80].
Blocks which are the leasing units in the North Sea are
of about 90 square miles each, far larger than in the
US, and another contrast with the US has been that the
lessees in any one field are obliged to exploit the field
as a single unit; one of the group of firms with leases in
a field acts as operator on behalf of them all. This
avoids any race among firms on a field to see which
can get most out of a common pooi, and it also
economises on equipment.
There has been no clearly enunciated policy on the rate
at which fields will be opened, but it is probably fair to
say that the state has been prepared to release areas for
exploration and fields for extraction almost as fast as
reputable firms have wanted to take them on.
The system of taxation of oïl and gas extraction has
been one of extraordinary complexity. It is widely
rcognised as an ideal that taxation of natural resources
should aim to recover for the state a large share at least
of the property or 'rental' value of the deposits without
discouraging (or on the other hand subsidising)
investment or altering firms decisions (other than for
clear social reasons) over the rate or technique of
production [Garnaut and Clunies Ross 1983]. There
are two simple principles by which this might be done.
One approach is to auction the rights for a lump sum
payable before exploitation begins. This is the method
('cash-bonus bidding') applied by the US Federal
Government to offshore and some onshore fields and
by some US States and cities and Canadian Provinces
[Mead 1977]. If the bidders assume competition and
also ignore risk when bidding for a particular block,
this method should on the whole provide for the state
the most optimistic bidder's estimate of what the net
property-value of the lease is. Though these conditions
will not always and everywhere be fulfilled,
experience, at least until the mid- 1970s, suggested that
this was a very effective way of recovering the full rent
of oil under the circumstances existing in the US
[Mead 1977:46-57].
The second approach is to apply a proportional tax ex
post to positive and negative cash flows, or to
discounted cash flows, arising from the extraction.
The latter version of this method is the 'additional
profits tax' [Goss 1986; Garnaut and Clunies Ross
1983, 97-9] pioneered in Papua New Guinea, and
applied in Tanzania and elsewhere (often with the
support of the Technical Assistance Group of the
Commonwealth Secretariat, or, more recently, of the
Energy Department of the World Bank) and latterly
on oil in Australia. Since the rate of tax cannot be
100 per cent, this method cannot realise all the rent,
and it raises problems over fixing the discount rate
correctly, but with the right discount rate it will extract
a large proportion of the rent without discouraging or
subsidising investment.
The UK used the auction method of allotting blocks
only in 1971 when 15 blocks (a small fraction of those
released during that year) were auctioned and realised
£34 mn between them. Its oil-tax system, as introduced
in 1975, was largely based on realised profit or
profitability. There has also, however, been a 12.5 per
cent ad valorem 'royalty' on oil and gas introduced as
part of the contract agreement with each licensee and
consequently removable at the Minister's discretion.
The removability makes it possible in principle to
avoid any marginal disincentive effect that the royalty
might present, especially in the later stages of
extraction.
Corporation tax (CT) has been applied to oil and gas
producers within what has been called a 'ring fence';
the company must treat its North Sea operations
separately from its other activities, so that it cannot
offset losses on the latter against profits on the former.
Before CT is assessed, however, the company is liable
for Petroleum Revenue Tax (PRT). PRT is assessed on
each field individually, so that there is what might be
called an inner ring fence around each field for this
purpose in addition to the outer North Sea ring fence
which applies to CT. However, abortive exploration
expenditure anywhere in the UK North Sea can be
treated as a deduction. Each company pays PRT
according to its share in the field.
Extraction of oil and gas is peculiar in that so much of
the cost is incurred before actual production begins, at
least unless secondary or tertiary methods of
extraction are applied. It is therefore more than
usually inappropriate to treat pre-production costs as
'investment' and somehow separate from the costs of
extraction.
PRT is framed as if it were based on sales of oil and
gas, but it was apparently originally conceived as
something like a tax on undiscounted cash flow, with
all the costs incurred simply deducted from sales
revenue before the latter became subject to the tax.
Because of the cost of time and because there may be
considerable delay between the occurrence of costs
and the sales receipts to which they are directed, this
would have been potentially discouraging to some
otherwise viable projects.
PRT was accordingly modified, before the proposals
became official in February 1975, not by accumulating
past expenses at an interest rate for time but by
allowing the deduction not only of the expenses
themselves but of an additional 75 per cent (later
changed to 35 per cent) of the value of most
expenditures other than that on fixed assets. This,
known as the 'offset', was at best a very crude way of
making allowance for the cost of time and thus
directing the tax to pure profit or rent, and hence a
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further complication was introduced in the form of the
'oil allowance', which was designed to favour
differentially the less profitable fields. It was based on
the supposition that the smaller fields would generally
be the less profitable. The oil allowance exempted
from PRT the value of the first 500,000 tons (later
250,000 tonnes) of oil in any half-year, with a
maximum on any field of 10 mn tons (later 5 mn
tonnes). After all these allowances had been made, the
rate of the PRT was originally 45 per cent, but it was
raised successively to 60, 70 and 75 per cent over
1979-82.
Though the oil allowance favoured smaller fields, it
would not guarantee that a field on which a low but
positive discounted value might be realised in the
absence of PRT would not become effectively loss-
making after the tax. So one furthér complication was
introduced in what was called the 'safeguard'. This
provided that the PRT on a field in a year should not
exceed 80 per cent of the amount by which the
'adjusted profits' of the year exceeded 30 per cent of
total past capital expenditure in the field, the terms
being appropriately defined. In other words, the year's
profits could be as much as 30 per cent of the
investment made without incurring PRT, and PRT
could be no more than 80 per cent of the amount by
which this 30 per cent 'return' was exceeded.
On the face of it, a simpler way of accomplishing the
objective of this elaborate structure would have been
to frame the tax as a proportion of the aggregate which
the investor was supposed to be maximising. If this
was discounted present value of cash flows, then the
tax should be a proportion of discounted present value
as that was realised. The tax, unless it was at such a
high rate as to make marginal net receipts of little
account, would then not affect the investor's
behaviour, since the actions which would give him the
highest net present value before tax would still give
him the highest net present value after tax.
It would be desirable that a tax system should be
responsive enough to changing circumstances that its
rules would not themselves need to be changed. This
was not so with the PRT. In the face of the second
round of huge oil-price rises it was made progressively
more severe in 1979, 1980 and 1981. In 1981, an
additional tax, supplementary petroleum duty (SPD),
was added, something like a 20 per cent additional ad
valorem duty on gross revenue, collected before PRT
and CT but subject to an exemption corresponding to
the oil allowance. This applied over 1981 and 1982
only, and it was in the wake of the 1981 budget that the
complaints of the oil industry were loudest. Estimates
setting the average rate of tax in total on oil income at
about 85-86 per cent and the top marginal rate as just
over 90 per cent were given for 1981-82 [Dafter
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Financial Times, 1982:23]. From the 1982 Budget there
was progressive mitigation of the rigours of the tax
system. Under the 1983 Budget certain new fields were
given exemption from the royalty and for PRT
purposes a doubled oil allowance.
Despite what may seem the clumsiness of the tax
provisions applying to oil and gas, they could hardly
be regarded as disastrous. From 1981 to 1985, they
realised for the state from 49 to 52 per cent of gross
sales revenue. Moans from the industry were not
plaintive except in 1981 and 1982, and capital
investment associated with oil and gas was maintained,
according to official estimates, surprisingly well at
between £2 bn and £3 bn nominal each year from 1978
to 1985, with the real fall in 1985 fairly modest, and the
investment representing generally 20 per cent or more
of the country's fixed capital formation for the year
(UK Department of Energy, various years).
It is not clear why auctioning of rights was never
extended beyond the 15 blocks put up for bidding in
1971. That experiment did not give any clear
indication that the practice was harmful or worthless,
and there would have been no inconsistency in
combining auctioning with an ex post tax based on
profitability. In fact quite a large number of
companies have North Sea interests, and the early
wish to favour the UK-based majors [Hamilton
1978:l7ff.] has probably disappeared by now.
The policy of exploiting the oil almost as fast as
companies are prepared to take it out might be
questioned, but the uncertainties of the scale of
remaining reserves and their commercial value makes
that approach tempting, and apart from some of the
richest Arab producers few governments if any can
have resisted it.
Since stabilisation in the years of high oil revenues was
highly unsuccessful, as discussed below, it is natural to
wonder whether defects in the tax or leasing
arrangements were responsible. For the tax system
this can hardly have been so. Though its many changes
probably created uncertainty for investors, there is no
evidence that this seriously disturbed investment,
which continued surprisingly steady, even in 198 1-82.
Government revenue from oil has always been less
than 10 per cent of total government outlays, with the
peak approached gradually; even if it were to
disappear entirely over say three years, the disturbance
would not be disastrous; and the trouble so far in the
economy has been associated with rising, not falling,
revenue.
It may be, however, that if fields had been released for
exploitation much more slowly the economy would
have enjoyed a smoother course. The plausibility of
this view depends on the question, discussed below, of
the reason for the very large rise in the UK's real
effective exchange rate to 1980. If this was due mainly
to changes in actual trade flows, then it seems likely
that slower exploitation would have been less
disturbing; but it is not clear how far that is so.
Stabilisation
In a small developing country, for which the sales of
some primary commodity make up a large part of
GDP, the government is likely to expand its activities,
feeding a boom in the economy, when the price is high,
only to be faced with the need to contract, which is
difficult and painful and leads to recession, when the
price falls.
This was not the case in Britain, which since 1974 has
slumped in times of rising oil prices and if anything
recovered somewhat as real oil prices fell.
The paradox is partly explained by the fact that oil did
not have anything like the relative importance that it
had in the economy of, for example, Nigeria or
Venezuela, and hence the general world slumps that
followed the two rounds of oil-price rises outweighed
any direct boost from the price rises in their effects on
the economy. Commercial production of UK North
Sea oil did not begin after all until 1975 when the first
recession was already well under way.
However, that cannot be the whole story. The UK,
though not particularly early in entering the 1974-76
slump, rather led the field into that of 1980-82. The
government that came to power in mid-1979 was
committed to a policy of price-deflation by rigorous
monetary restraint, and that must have been
important in precipitating the 1980 slump in the UK.
Added to this, the exchange rate rose from 1977 to
1980 by 33 per cent against the dollar, and by 19 per
cent against a trade-weighted basket of currencies. But
British wages and prices were at the same time rising
much faster than the average of industrial countries.
The net effect of these two movements has been
estimated as raising the 'international' cost of
manufacturing labour in relation to that in competitor
countries (one version of the 'real exchange rate') by
5 1-55 per cent over those three years, so that for the
UK to remain equally competitive in manufacturing
labour productivity would have needed to rise in
relation to that in other countries by about a half.
This, together with the high nominal interest rates
introduced by the monetary restraint, dealt a blow of
quite extraordinary severity to manufactures. The
UK's balance of trade in manufactures (in 1980 prices)
fell from an average of £6.3 bn a year over 1977-78 to
an average of £1.0 bn a year over 198 1-82, and in fact
to £0.1 bn in 1982. Manufacturing output fell by
four per cent altogether over 1973-79 and by 14 per cent
over 1979-82.
Since manufacturing generally has a much higher
labour component than oil-extraction, this change
alone goes some way to explaining the rapid rise in the
unemployment rate: from 4.6 per cent in mid-1979 to
11.1 per cent in mid-1983. North Sea oil has been
estimated to have generated only about 100,000 jobs,
and these were probably almost all in place by 1979.
The subsequent fall in the trade-weighted exchange
rate (back by 1984to slightly below the 1977 level) has
not to any great extent restored the manufacturing
output lost: understandably, since the real effective
exchange rate measured as above by international
labour-cost comparisons left British labour costs in
1984 still 32 per cent (or in another estimate 45 per
cent) above those of 1977, (figures from IMF
International Financial Statistics, Cost and Price
Comparisons for Manufacturing). In any case a
manufacturing sector is perhaps more quickly
destroyed than restored, especially in an environment
of great uncertainty about the future of real exchange
rates. Manufacturing output in 1984 was still
eight per cent lower than in 1979.
Why did the pound's real exchange rate rise so
markedly from 1977 to 1980? How far can oil and how
far can policy be held responsible? There is no general
agreement on how exchange rates are determined in a
free market, but it seems quite likely that at least three
factors, and possibly a fourth, were relevant. One was
the marked change in external trade as the country
moved from being a large net importer of oil (still
about 43 mn tonnes in 1978) to become a net exporter
by 1981. A second was the high nominal interest rates
maintained over much of 1979, 1980 and 1981. [For
outline and explanation of the policies, see Keegan
1984, chs. 4, 5.] A third factor was the view, hinted at
whenever the term 'petrocurrency' was used, that,
because the UK was to become an oil exporter at a
time when historically high real prices for oil were
commonly thought likely to continue, its currency was
a secure haven, especially when the country had a
tough deflationary government. A fourth possible
element was the doubt by 1980 about the economic
control exercised by the Carter government in the US.
Thus, how far the rise in exchange rate can be
attributed directly to oil, how far to largely false
expectations generated by oil, and how far to quite
other factors, is hard to disentangle.
Re-running the 1980s
One lesson that has been widely drawn from the UK's
unhappy experience of the early 1980s is that some
stability in the real effective exchange rate should have
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been maintained. The wild fluctuations of dollar, yen
and pound against each other have contrasted with the
more orderly adjustments of the currencies within the
European Monetary System. But, apart from joining
the EMS in order to reinforce other policies for
stability, what ought the UK to have done in the
extraordinary circumstances of 1979-82?
The Thatcher government was preoccupied with the
rate of growth of the domestic price level as a target
variable and at first with the public's holdings of
money as the sole important instrument of macro-
economic control. The government seems to have
started with the belief that there was a unique and
stable relationship between the money supply and the
price level complicated only by an unreliable time lag
between the two. In controlling the money supply but
leaving all particular prices uncontrolled, it was
believed, the government would not only control the
general price level but also ensure, as far as
macroeconomic policy could do so, that all other
variables of major concern (employment, the
exchange rate, foreign payments) would reach the best
levels available. The exchange rate was a price like any
other and it could be relied on, if left to itself, to find its
own proper level. The same was held to apply to wage
rates provided price expectations could be stabilised.
As a subsidiary objective, the government wanted to
decrease the size of the public sector.
The government's unreadiness for what was to happen
in 1980 was enhanced by the fact that everyone was
used to a 'weak' pound, that is one whose tendency, if
left to the market, was to fall in value. The
appreciation of the currency, when it came, was at first
accepted by some associated with the government as a
dictate of the market and welcomed by others as a
factor tending to reduce the rate of inflation. Some
officials realised, but others were too slow to accept,
that the combination of wage and exchange-rate rises
might kill off much of the manufacturing sector
[Keegan 1984:158-651.
As a general rule, where a commodity of fluctuating
price or limited life is important, the government must
'lean against' the destabilising effects, even where they
seem to be pleasant. While not dissipating the benefits
that the commodity brings, it must ensure that good
times do not lead to habits and expectations that can
not be sustained in bad times, and that other assets are
not despoiled. This general rule is as relevant for
Britain or the Netherlands as it is for Mexico or Libya
or Norway, but the applications are different.
For the latter group the important impact of the
commodity earnings is on public finance, and, difficult
as it is politically, the rule must be to keep public
spending to a 'permanently' sustainable level in line
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with the level of 'permanent' revenue, and to
accumulate any surplus into reserves that can be
drawn down when earnings fall. Needless to say, such
a discipline requires the enshrinement of'best guesses'
about the medium-term future, and in the case of oil
since the early 1970s these have been notoriously hard
to make with accuracy. Stabilisation policy always has
to be a mixture between reasonable provision against
what is likely to happen and response to what has
actually happened.
For the former group, in which the commodity does
not bulk so large and the country's currency is widely
held internationally, the need, as the UK has learned,
is to achieve some stability in the real effective
exchange rate. As with the other group, this may
require some way of holding, as internationally
negotiable but not highly liquid reserves, the
abnormal receipts which in this case would otherwise
exert an upward movement on the value of the
currency if they were not immediately spent on goods
and services.
The UK's objective clearly should have been to
maintain 'full' employment and therewith to retain
those tradeable-goods industries which, even if they
might seem to an extent dispensable when oil earnings
were high (in that those employed in them might
instead have been engaged in public-sector activities
for which the oil earnings would have sufficed to pay),
would be needed when the oil receipts fell.
How could this be done? Suppose for a start that
money wages had behaved precisely as they actually
did and that money supply figures too had been as they
actually were. It might have been possible to maintain
full employment by fiscal expansion, specifically by
maintaining tax rates as they were but expanding
government services and construction, financing the
increment through domestic borrowing. This, however,
beside being contrary to the government's ideology,
would have raised the interest rate even higher, and
quite possibly (though by no means certainly) also left
the exchange rate even higher than it was. The decline
of manufacturing might have proceeded more or less
as it has actually done, and, though life would have
been more pleasant for many people in the meantime,
the infrastructure by now better and real national
income higher, there would still have been a seemingly
unnecessary disruption of occupational patterns and
depletion of productive capacity by 1986 when the oil
earnings had fallen off.
Alternatively, the authorities could have abandoned
the money-supply targets and allowed for substantial
expansion of domestic credit so as to keep interest
rates and consequently the exchange rate down, the
latter possibly to around the real effective level of
1977. If the usual methods of expanding the money
supply seemed inadequate or inopportune, the
authorities could presumably have released pounds
specifically onto the foreign exchanges by buying up
securities issued by foreign governments and the
debentures or shares of foreign companies, thus
immobilising the additional earnings in the form of
reserves which would represent longer-term claims on
the rest of the world. On the given-money-wage
assumption, keeping the exchange rate low would
have left real wages somewhat lower and the price level
somewhat higher in the middle of the period than was
actually the case. But much of the 22 per cent (1.6 mn
jobs) of manufacturing employment that disappeared
in fact between 1979 and 1983 would have been
preserved. Moreover a readiness to expand into export
markets, which seems in many cases to have been
blunted by the experiences of the last few years, might
have persisted and developed.
But is it unrealistic to assume that the expansion of
domestic credit would have left money wages
unchanged? The government would certainly argue
that it was. If lower exchange rates would have meant
proportionately higher wages this benign alternative
story would not have been possible.
Money-wage levels in the UK, as in most highly
industrialised countries, are determined mainly in
processes of bargaining between large employers or
associations of employers on the one side and more or
less powerful trade unions on the other. There is no
regular national organisation and rationalisation of
these bargaining processes as in Japan, Sweden or
Austria. Governments, however, have tried for much
of the 1960s and 1970s to introduce principles of
restraint, but usually by fairly simple formulas which
have several times collapsed in strikes and political
embarrassment.
The Thatcher government has remained committed
against any wage policy, partly from reaction against
the failings of these experiments, partly out of
doctrine.
Yet, without some control of the general level of
wages, achievement of the other main objectives of
policy cannot be demonstrated as possible. The
government's original view that money-supply targets
can be maintained and that then all will fall into place
has not been borne out by seven years of experience.
Money-supply targets have been difficult or impossible
to achieve and in spite of the attempt wage-rates and
exchange-rates have moved perversely. Coherent
alternative approaches, that rely on matching the
number of instruments to the number of targets and
are concerned to promote the three targets of full
employment, price stability and a certain mix between
market and non-market activities in an internationally
open economy, are almost inevitably obliged to look
to wage control as one of the instruments, along with
fiscal policy and monetary policy.
Such control may or may not itself be possible. If it is
not, however, the capacity of the UK to maintain a
stable growth path in the face of such disturbances as
the oil crises and its own oil bonanza must be doubtful.
If on the other hand such institutionalised control of
the general rate of wage settlements is possible, we can
at least gain some idea with hindsight of how this
combination of events might have been satisfactorily
handled.
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